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QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The sole question presented by the Petition for Writ of
Certiorari is whether the petitioners have demonstrated any special
and important reasons that would justify review of the Court of
Appeals7

decision.

As

demonstrated

herein, there

are

special and important reasons.
CONTROLLING STATUTES AND RULES
Rule 43, Rules of the Utah Supreme Court:
Review by a writ of certiorari is not a
matter of right, but of judicial discretion,
and will be granted only when there are special
and important reasons therefor. The following,
while neither controlling nor wholly measuring
the court's discretion, indicate the character
of reasons that will be considered:
(1) When a panel of the Court of Appeals
has rendered a decision in conflict with a
decision of another panel of the Court of
Appeals on the same issue of law;
(2) When a panel of the Court of Appeals
has decided a question of state or federal law
in a way that is in conflict with a decision of
this court;
(3) When a panel of the Court of Appeals
has rendered a decision that has so far
departed from the accepted and usual course of
judicial proceedings or has so far sanctioned
such a departure by a lower court as to call
for an exercise of this court's power of
supervision; or
(4) When the Court of Appeals has decided
an important question of municipal, state, or
federal law which has not been, but should be,
settled by this court.

1

no

such

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Petitioners have requested a Writ of Certiorari from the
decision

of

the

Court

of

Appeals

sustaining

petitioners' claims for equitable relief.

the

dismissal

of

The sole issue presented

to this Court is whether petitioners' brief raises the appropriate
considerations governing review of certiorari by the Utah Supreme
Court.
Course of the Proceedings and Disposition in Lower Courts
In February of 1987, a complaint was filed by Petitioners
challenging the validity of a combination of four dairy cooperatives which took place between 1984 and 1986.

The complaint sought

rescission and damages on behalf of a purported class (R. 1-26).
Plaintiffs/Petitioners filed a motion for partial summary
judgment, asserting that no dispute of material facts existed (R.
52) , and asking for judgment as a matter of law (R. 49) .

Plain-

tiffs also requested that they be certified as representatives of a
proposed class, under Rule 23, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (R.
8).
Defendants/Respondents

filed

countering

motions

for

summary judgment (R. 177, 224), as well as a motion to dismiss (R.
91) .

The parties all filed memoranda in support of their motions

and in opposition to the opposing parties7 motions
117, 154, 184, 196, 247, 268, 469, 514, 525).

2

(R. 94, 107,

A consolidated statement of undisputed facts was exchanged between the parties, resulting in agreement on many material
facts (R. 140-153).

Affidavits and deposition testimony were also

submitted to the trial court, and made part of the record (R. 166176, Addendum No. 5; R. 180-183, Addendum No. 6; R. 239-242; R.
243-246; R. 482-513, Addendum No. 8; R. 529-547, 548-551; Addendum
No. 7 and 4 ) .
The district court heard the pending motions on June 8,
1987, and issued a memorandum decision on June 29, 1987 (R. 552554).

On July 23, 1987, the district court executed an order in

accordance with its memorandum decision (R. 586-589; Addendum No.
3).

By its order, the court denied plaintiffs7 request for class

certification. It also dismissed plaintiffs7 claims for rescission
on two alternate grounds.

As its first ground for dismissal of the

rescission claim, the district court noted that "there are many
other

entities,

people

involved,

that

have

so

changed

their

position in reliance upon the transfer of assets that it would be
inequitable

for the court to consider the remedies of recession

[sic] and restitution."

(R. 587).

The court's second ground for

dismissal was apparently based on the applicability of Utah Code
Ann., Sec. 3-1-30, et seq.
court's

findings

on

the

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
applicability

of

laches,

and

did

not

because

the

address the second ground of dismissal.
The

district

court

also

observed

that,

petitioners had made no individual claims for damages, its rulings
3

on class certification and rescission required dismissal
claims of the complaint as they were pled.
court

also

ruled that

its ruling was without

of the

However, the trial
prejudice

to any

claims which the plaintiffs individually might have for damages.
The

court

made

clear

that

its

ruling would

not

preclude

such

claims, and expressly granted leave for plaintiffs to amend their
complaint to include them (R. 586-589; Addendum No. 3 ) .
The court expressly made no ruling

as to whether the

transfer of assets from CVDA to IMPA was wrongful, and specifically
reserved

such factual determination, as well as related

factual

determinations, for future proceedings after the anticipated amendment of the plaintiffs' complaint (R. 586-589; Addendum No. 3 ) .
Even though they had been granted leave to do so, plaintiffs elected not to amend their complaint and proceed with their
own claims for damages, but chose instead to pursue this appeal (R.
591-592).
Statement of Facts
Petitioners are all members and directors of Cache Valley
Dairy Association

("CVDA"), a respondent in the captioned appeal.

CVDA is an agricultural cooperative in the business of promoting
and

facilitating

dairy products.

production,

distribution

and

sale

of members'

(R. 141, 167; Addendum No. 9 and 5 ) .

On June 27, 1984, the directors of CVDA entered into a
Letter

of

Association

Intent

to

create

the

Intermountain

Milk

Producers

("IMPA") by transferring assets and liabilities from
4

CVDA and other existing cooperatives to IMPA.
542; Addendum No. 9, 5, and 7 ) .

(R. 170, 530, 536-

On November 27, 1985, approximate-

ly 18 months after the directors had voiced their intent to combine
the cooperatives, they voted to seek approval for the combination
from the members of CVDA. (R. 144, 180-182, 529-547; Addendum No.
9, 5 and 7 ) .

On December 16, 1985, each present member of CVDA,

including the appellants, received notice of the special meeting of
members to approve the combination of CVDA with the other cooperatives.

Members voted 103 to 43 in favor of combining the coopera-

tives and creating the IMPA.

(R. 429-547; Addendum No. 7 ) .

Legal documents transferring assets and liabilities of
CVDA to IMPA were signed by Gordon Zilles, one of the appellants,
in February 1986.

The combination of cooperatives and creation of

IMPA was complete on August 1, 1986.
Addendum 9, 5 and 7 ) .

(R. 144-145, 170, 529-547;

Petitioners filed their verified complaint

in the captioned matter more than six months later seeking rescission of the combination and damages.

(R. 1-2 6) .

As the Court of Appeals determined, the record conclusively shows that during the six months between the time IMPA was
established and when this lawsuit was initiated, CVDA, IMPA, the
other dairy cooperatives which combined with CVDA, the members of
all combining cooperatives, and members, creditors, customers and
employees of IMPA had all relied and changed their positions upon
the combination of the cooperatives.
13) .

(Appendix, Part A, Opinion at

The undisputed facts in the record demonstrating reliance on
5

the formation of IMPA included:

(1) IMPA's construction of a $10

million milk plant in Salt Lake County (R. 148-149, 173); (2) the
sale of certain dairy plants, and the removal of dairy equipment
from plants which was later sold off or placed in other plants at
considerable

expense

(R.

150,

175) ;

(3) the

reduction

of

milk

production in IMPA's operating area, which affected every cheese
and surplus milk plant in the area (R. 147-148; Addendum No. 9) ;
and

(4) the issuance of a credit line from Sacramento Bank for

Cooperatives

with

the

assets

of

all

former

cooperatives

being

pledged by IMPA as security for loans (R. 14 6, 171; Addendum No. 9
and 5 ) .
The trial court applied the doctrine of laches to dismiss
plaintiffs7 first, second and fifth causes of action.
Part B, Memorandum Decision at 2) .

(Appendix,

In upholding the trial court's

decision, the Utah Court of Appeals

affirmed the lower court's

finding that appellants had unreasonably delayed filing their complaint, and that their unreasonable delay resulted in prejudice to
the defendants.

(Appendix, Part A, Opinion at 12-13).

The Court of Appeals' holding that appellants had unreasonably delayed filing suit was based in part on the personal
involvement of the directors of CVDA with the combination process.
The court noted that appellants unquestionably had notice of the
proposed formation of IMPA, and that their decision to wait until
six months after IMPA was created to file suit was unreasonable.
(Appendix,

Part

A,

Opinion

at
6

12-13).

The

Court

of

Appeals

examined

the

actions

of

CVDA,

IMPA

and

numerous

third

parties

(discussed in detail above) in determining that respondents were
prejudiced by the appellants7 delay in seeking an available remedy.
(Appendix, Part A, Opinion at 13).
ARGUMENT
I.

PETITIONERS HAVE FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THE
EXISTENCE OF ANY SPECIAL AND IMPORTANT REASONS
THAT WOULD JUSTIFY THE EXTRAORDINARY GRANT OF
A WRIT OF CERTIORARI.
Rule 43 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court (which was

added effective April 20, 1987), provides that review by a Writ of
Certiorari "is not a matter of right, but of judicial discretion,
and

will

be granted

reasons therefor,"

only when there are special
(Emphasis added).

and

important

Because this Court has not

yet elaborated on the considerations set forth in Rule 43, it is
useful

to

review

decisions

interpreting

the

comparable

federal

provisions.

Shortly after passage of the federal statutory writ of

certiorari,

the

United

States

Supreme

Court

established

foundations of the certiorari doctrine:
While this power is coextensive with all possible necessities and sufficient to secure to
this court a final control over the litigation
in all the Courts of Appeal, it is a power
which will be sparingly exercised, and only
when the circumstances of the case satisfy us
that the importance of the question involved,
the necessity of avoiding conflict between two
or more courts of appeal, or between courts of
appeal and the courts of a state, or some
matter affecting the interests of this nation
in its internal or external relations, demands
such exercise.
7

the

Forsyth v. Hammond, 166 U.S. 506, 515 (1897) (emphasis added).
limited

exercise

of

discretion

described

by

the

United

The

States

Supreme Court serves important public and institutional policies
which are just as applicable to the Utah Supreme Court.
grant

of

certiorari

reliability

of

review

decisions

would

rendered

undermine
by

the

the
Court

finality
of

Moreover, broad review would defeat the institutional
easing the burden on the Supreme Court.

Liberal
and

Appeals.
policy of

As noted by Professors

Wright & Miller in the federal context:
In most circumstances, the Supreme Court exercises its discretion on the assumption that it
cannot function as an ordinary appellate court
concerned with achieving individual justice in
individual cases. . . .
As the number of cases
seeking review has grown, the docket has had to
be devoted more and more to constitutional and
statutory questions that are likely to have
widespread general impact.
16 C. Wright, A. Miller, E. Cooper & E. Gressman, Federal Practice
and Procedure § 4004, at 507-08 (1977).
The only ground upon which petitioners rely in seeking
review by Writ of Certiorari apparently

is based on Rule 43(4).

Petitioners assert that
[a]s the record now sits it is unclear whether
agricultural
cooperative associations are
required to comply with Sections 3-1-30 et seq.
Even in this very case there has been no ruling
on that central issue yet the case is being
remanded for further proceedings.
The large
number of agricultural cooperatives and their
members are left in a state of confusion.
Indeed if Sections 3-1-30 et seq. can be
disregarded, can other Sections of Title 3 be
disregarded as well.
This is an important
question of state law "which has not been, but
8

should be, settled by this Court."
Utah S.Ct.

Rule 43 R.

(Petition at 15) .
Petitioners' reliance on Rule 43 appears to be misplaced.
Rule 43(4) indicates that review may be appropriate "[w]hen the Court
of Appeals has decided an important question of municipal, state,
or federal law which has not been, but should be, settled by this
court."

In its decision, the Court of Appeals found it unnecessary

to address the issue of whether, and to what extent, the statutory
merger provisions were applicable.

Indeed, the court assumed for

purposes of its opinion that the statutory provisions applied and
had not been followed.

The court did not "decide an important

question" concerning the applicability of the statute, but instead
concluded that resolution of the case was properly based on the
application of the laches doctrine.

Rule 43(4), which hinges on a

decision by the Court of Appeals concerning

state law, is thus

irrelevant under the facts of this action.
Petitioners' argument appears to be that this Court should
decide issues of statutory construction which are irrelevant to the
Court of Appeals' holding.

In essence, therefore, petitioners are

seeking an advisory opinion.

This Court and the Court of Appeals

have established a "longstanding judicial policy in Utah to avoid
advisory opinions . . . "
32, 33 (App. 1990).

Reynolds v. Reynolds, 129 Utah Adv. Rep.

The circumstances of this case do not warrant

deviation from that well-established rule.

9

Having established that subpart (4) of Rule 43 is inapplicable herein, respondents will quickly address the remaining
three subparts of the rule.

Subparts (1) and (2) are both plainly

inapplicable by their express terms. The Court of Appeals' decision
was neither in conflict with a decision of another panel of the
Court of Appeals, nor in conflict with a decisions of this Court.
Subpart (3) provides for issuance of writs of certiorari
when the Court of Appeals has totally departed, or sanctioned a
departure, from "the usual course of judicial proceedings."
departure has not been demonstrated.

Such a

As set forth in the Statement

of Facts portion of this brief, supra, the trial court found, and
the Court of Appeals confirmed, that the doctrine of laches was
properly applied to dismiss the first, second and fifth causes of
action in the complaint because petitioners had waited an unreasonable length of time to initiate legal proceedings, which prejudiced
the defendants.

The holdings of both courts were based on undis-

puted facts.
In light of the trial court's determinations and applicable law, it is apparent that the Court of Appeals was fully
justified in affirming the trial court's dismissal of the petitioners' claims seeking equitable relief.
held otherwise.

It could hardly have

No departure from the usual course of judicial

proceedings was involved.

Since the grounds for granting a writ of

certiorari have not been shown, this court should deny Brice's
Petition.
10

II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS APPROPRIATELY RULED ON THE
DISTRICT COURT'S DISMISSAL.
At the outset, it should be noted that the positions

asserted in petitioners' two separate arguments appear inconsistent
on their face.

In a portion of appellants' brief entitled "First

Question Presented," appellants seem to concede that the doctrine
of laches was properly applied to dismiss their claims for equitable
relief:
[The trial judge] expressly found that the
plaintiffs could amend their complaint to seek
damages. The trial judge erred because plaintiffs were seeking money damages but his
reasoning about laches is sound.
Certainly a
court of equity can restrict forms of relief
because of the presence of laches.
(Petition, p. 15, emphasis added).

Although petitioners appear to

concede in the first portion of their argument that laches properly
precluded their claims for equitable relief, they go on to dispute
the proper application of laches in the subsequent section of their
brief under the heading "Second Question Presented."
will

address

appellants'

specific

However, respondents desire to

arguments

more

Respondents
fully

below.

impress upon the court the bald

contradiction of appellants' arguments.

Respondents contend that

the contradictions and confusion inherent in appellants' position
is itself strong justification for a summary denial of the requested
writ.

11

A.
The Arguments Asserted in Support of Petitioners' "First
Question Presented" are Irrelevant,
Petitioners

styled

the

"First Question

Presented"

in

their brief as whether the Court of Appeals correctly determined the
rights of the participants in merging agricultural cooperatives.
As set forth previously, the Court of Appeals assumed the applicability of Utah Code Ann. sec. 3-1-30 et seq. , and that respondents
had not complied with the statutory provisions.

However, the Court

of Appeals went on to hold that petitioners' claims for equitable
relief were barred by their unreasonable delay in seeking a remedy,
and by the prejudice that would result to respondents and others by
a rescission of the IMPA combination.

Consequently, petitioner's

first argument is irrelevant.
It should also be noted that in the portion of their
brief relating to the "First Question Presented" the petitioners
discuss at length their claims for damages.

Petitioners' argument

concerning their damage claims is puzzling in light of the Court of
Appeals' decision reversing the trial court's dismissal of those
claims.

The fact that the Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal

and remanded is further evidence of the irrelevance of the arguments
asserted in support of the petitioners' "First Question Presented."

12

B.
The Court of Appeals Properly Held that Petitioners' Claims
for Equitable Relief Were Barred by the Doctrine of Laches,
Petitioners7

"Second Question Presented" is simply that

the Court of Appeals improperly applied the doctrine of laches to
bar their claims for equitable relief.

However, it is plain from

the court's opinion that the applicability of laches was carefully
considered.

As the Court noted, "laches is appropriately applied

where there is (1) unreasonable delay by a plaintiff in seeking an
available remedy, and (2) prejudice to the defendant resulting from
that delay."

(Appendix, Part A, Opinion at 12.)

Therefore, the

applicability of laches necessarily depends on the facts of each
case.

In this case, the Court of Appeals noted that the parties

did not agree on all facts set forth in the
exchanged by parties.

statements-of-fact

(Appendix, Part A, Opinion at 8 ) . However,

the court held that the facts which were stipulated justified the
trial court's conclusion that laches barred petitioners7 claims for
equitable relief.
The
facts,

(Appendix A, Part A, Opinion at 8, 13).

Court

petitioners7

of Appeals held that, under the
delay

in

combination was unreasonable.

challenging
The court

the

validity

application

of

the

further held that the

delay had caused substantial prejudice to respondents.
13, Appendix A.)

undisputed

(Opinion at

The resolution of the laches issue was simply an

of that

doctrine

to undisputed

present an issue for review.

13

facts

and

does

not

III.

THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI SHOULD ALSO BE
DENIED ON THE BASIS OF JUDICIAL ECONOMY.
Rule 43, Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, makes clear

that this Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a
petition for Writ of Certiorari for the review of a Court of
Appeals decision.

In this case, the interests of judicial economy

further compel the Court to exercise its discretion to deny the
Petition for Writ of Certiorari.
This dispute has been decided after careful and timeconsuming consideration by the Court of Appeals.

The resources and

time of both the judicial system and the litigants will be spared
by this Court's refusal to grant the Writ of Certiorari.

The Court

of Appeals was created primarily to relieve this Court of a portion
of its burden.

Having assigned this case to the Court of Appeals

for disposition in full accord with the above stated purpose, it
would be counterproductive for this Court to re-examine the same
issues.

The legal issues involved are not novel or of widespread

import, and do not warrant review by this Court.
CONCLUSION
No special and important reasons exist in this case for
this Court to grant a petition for a Writ of Certiorari.

The

decision of the Court of Appeals was correct, and does not conflict
in any way with prior decisions of this court or with decisions
from another panel of the Court of Appeals.

Furthermore, the case

does not involve any issues of widespread and significant importance
14

that would justify the expenditure of this Court's limited resources.
Rather, the case concerns the application of the equitable doctrine
of laches to undisputed facts that are unique to this case.

Any

further review would only serve to undermine the importance of the
Court of Appeals and the finality of its decision.

For the foregoing

reasons, respondents respectfully submit that the Petition for Writ
of Certiorari must be denied.
DATED this

tT^

day of April, 1990.
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C.

By
Roger P. ffhristensen
Karra J. Porter
Mark L. Anderson
Attorneys for Respondent IMPA
KIPP & CHRISTIAN, P.C,

By
J. Anthony Eyre
Attorneys for Respondent Directors
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

By
R. Brent Stephens
Robert H. Henderson
Attorneys for Respondent
Rand Wilson
HOUPT, ECKERSLEY & DOWNES
By
M. David Eckersley
Attorneys for Respondent CVDA
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APPENDIX
Appendix A: Brice et al, v. Cache Valley Dairy Association et al.,
Case No, 890289-CA, December 11, 1989 (Not for Publication
Appendix B: Brice v. Cache Valley Dairy Association, Civil No,
25514, Memorandum Decision, June 27, 1987. R, 552-554

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that on the

day of April, 1990,

4 true and correct copies of RESPONDENTS7 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI were mailed, postage prepaid, to:
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Court being sufficiently advised in the premises, it is now
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reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings in
accordance with the views expressed in the opinion filed
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Before Judges Jackson, Orme, and Bullock.1
JACKSON, Judge:
Appellants, who were members and directors of Cache Valley
Dairy Association (CVDA), an agricultural cooperative, appeal
from a summary judgment in favor of all defendants on all their
claims. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
CVDA is a nonprofit corporation first organized in 1935.
Its principal business was to promote and facilitate
production, distribution, and sale of members' dairy products
and by-products. To accomplish its purposes, CVDA's articles
of incorporation provided that it could "acquire, own, operate,
mortgage, control, hypothecate, sell and transfer any and all
kinds of real and personal property necessary to be used in the
carrying on of said business.H The association acted as agent
for its members in handling and dealing with their dairy
products. This agency relationship was created by the
execution of a marketing agreement between CVDA and each member
as an active milk producer. To become a member, a milk
producer had to sign an "Association Marketing Contract."
Termination of any producer's marketing contract terminated
membership. When a member ceased to be an active milk
producer, his eligibility for membership in CVDA ended.
Like other dairy cooperatives, CVDA raised working capital
by retaining part of the proceeds left from the sale of
members' milk products after payment of expenses. This process
created equity interests, called "producer equities," in
members of the cooperative based on each member's share of the
capital contribution. When a producer became inactive,
membership in CVDA ceased, but he retained his equity
interests. Producer equities were retired by CVDA on a
ten-year rotation cycle as working capital was replenished from
current revenues from the sale of active members' milk products.
CVDA's Board of Directors consisted of twenty-one elected
members. According to the complaint, the six individual
appellants were duly qualified and acting members of
1. J. Robert Bullock, Seniot District Judge, sitting by
special appointment pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-24(10)
(Supp. 1989).
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the CVDA Board of Directors, as well as producer members and
holders of producer equities worth more than $50, at all
material times. The CVDA Board took the following action on
June 27, 1984, with all board members present:
Manager Rick handed out to the Board a
letter of intent that would give the
management the go ahead to put together
the [Intermountain Milk Producers
Association]. It was necessary to have
Board approval for the President to sign
the letter of intent. Lynn Mieckle made a
motion that we accept the letter of intent
with Rulon King seconding and motion
carried.
Elections of the Directors to represent
Cache Valley Dairy Association as
Directors of the new IMPA Board are Frank
Olsen, Larry Pitcher, LaThair Peterson,
Vernon Bankhead, Lynn Mieckle, Douglas
Quayle and Wilford Meek, with William
Lindley being appointed Vice-chairman of
the committee.
The letter of intent approved by the CVDA Board was signed by
its President, William Lindley, following that Board meeting.
The document recites that the four parties (CVDA, Western
General Dairies, Inc., Star Valley Producers, Inc., and Lake
Mead Cooperative Association), "after considerable discussion
and negotiations," determined to form a marketing agency to be
called Intermountain Milk Producers Association (IMPA), a Utah
agricultural cooperative. The IMPA Board was to consist of
eighteen directors, including those elected by and from the
CVDA Board. The letter of intent provided for the immediate
formation of IMPA and commencement of its management operations
by August 1, 1984, with the ultimate goal of consolidating all
operations into IMPA. The letter of intent described how the
four parties would implement their plan and achieve their
objective, then stated in Paragraph 19:
At the time the consolidation is
accomplished, all members of the parties
will terminate their membership in the
parties and will be given membership in
IMPA. All remaining assets of the Parties
will be transferred to IMPA at book value
and all remaining debts will be assumed by
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IMPA. All employees will be transferred
to IMPA, subject to any labor contracts
which may then exist* Producer equities
held by the Parties will be assumed by
IMPA and will be rotated on a uniform
basis*
The CVDA Board met on November 27, 1985, with only one member,
respondent Robert Jackson, absent. The minutes compiled by
appellant Gordon Zilles, as secretary, show the following
action taken: -A meeting to merge the coop [sic] together was
discussed. On a motion by the Board, they voted 20 for and 1
voted against. Meeting adjourned.Pursuant to this authorization, the CVDA Board mailed
notice of a special meeting of members to be held December 16,
1985. According to the notice, the principal purpose of the
meeting was to "consider and vote upon the Plan of Merger
(Consolidation)" of the four cooperatives. Passage of the plan
was said to require only a simple majority of the members
present and voting at the special meeting. The notice was sent
to active producer members only, not to those who were inactive
producers holding equity certificates.
The -Summary of Plan of Merger (Consolidation)accompanying the notice stated that the four co-ops -propose to
consolidate their assets into IMPA.- The main paragraph of the
plan summary stated:
The terms and conditions are: 1) the
Consolidating Cooperatives will transfer
to IMPA all of their assets at book value
in exchange for the promise by IMPA to
assume all liabilities of said
cooperatives; b) All membership agreements
held by said cooperatives shall be
assigned to and assumed by IMPA in
accordance with their terms; c) all milk
base held by members shall become milk
base of IMPA on a pound-for-pound basis
subject to the same rules, regulations and
agreements in effect on the day the plan
is adopted; d) all equities of IMPA held
by members of said cooperatives shall
become equities of IMPA on a
dollar-for-dollar basis subject to
existing rules, regulations and
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agreements; f) all agreements, contracts,
claims and obligations whatsoever of said
cooperatives shall be assumed by IMPA as
though originally held by IMPA; g) All
employees employed by said cooperatives as
of the date of approval of the plan shall
become employees of IMPA and all
retirement plans, vacation accruals or
other employee benefits shall be assumed
by IMPA; and h) all other provisions of
the Agreement of Merger (Consolidation).
Paragraph 6 of the plan summary provided that the officers of
the consolidating cooperatives were to execute the documents
necessary to carry out the plan.
The provisions for merger of agricultural cooperatives set
forth in Utah Code Ann. §§ 3-1-30 to -41 (1988), a part of the
U]iiform"Agriculfcural--OaQp.exJLtj-ve Association Act added in 1965,
(^axB-aflmittedly not followed^ Among other things, the statute
mandates proxy voting at the special membership meeting to
approve a plan of merger. Utah Code Ann. § 3-1-34 (1988). It
also grants membership status, for purposes of notice and
voting on a plan of merger and dissenting rights, to holders of
"certificates of interest, patronage refund certificates or
other interest by whatever name designated* exceeding $50 in
value, even if those holders are not otherwise designated as
members by the cooperative's articles of incorporation. Utah
Code Ann. § 3-1-33 (1988).
Of the 146 CVDA members present at the special meeting held
on December 16, 1985, 103 voted in favor of a plan to combine
their cooperative with the others. Each member was allowed to
cast one vote, and no proxy voting was permitted. Nonmembers
holding producer equities were neither notified of the special
meeting nor allowed to vote.

4

Thereafter, the respective CVDA and IMPA Boards and
officers completed their combination on the terms and
conditions above. The assets of CVDA were transferred to IMPA
in February 1986. The transfer documents were signed by two
officers of CVDA, respondent William Lindley as President and
appellant Gordon Zilles as Secretary. The combination of the
four cooperatives pursuant to the letter of intent was complete
by August 1986. Each of the four cooperatives had transferred
all their assets to IMPA, and IMPA had assumed all of their
liabilities. In March 1986, IMPA had redeemed $1,173,989 of

AQn9QO_r,&

CVDA producer equities, reducing outstanding CVDA producer
equities by twenty percent and placing the unredeemed producer
equities on the same repayment rotation schedule as that used
in the other three combined cooperatives. IMPA had used the
assets received from the four combined cooperatives as
collateral to establish an $18,000,000 line of credit with the
Sacramento Bank for Cooperatives. Consolidated financial
statements and joint tax returns were filed for the fiscal
years ending July 31, 1985, and July 31, 1986. Approximately
eighty-two IMPA producers, who had been active members of CVDA
until the cooperatives combined operations, converted from
Grade B milk base status to Grade A, and they were consequently
receiving payments for their milk at a higher rate. Each
member of IMPA, including those from CVDA, who converted milk
base from Grade B to Grade A had expended funds to upgrade
their facilities in order to qualify. Numerous other
significant changes in operations had occurred, including
changes in the system for collection and transport of milk,
reassignment of employees, insurance and workers* compensation
coverage changes, capital purchases, construction of new
facilities, and termination of CVDA profit-sharing and pension
plans.
Some time after August 1986, several directors of CVDA
expressed concern about the manner and method in which the
combination of CVDA into IMPA had been carried out. Seventeen
CVDA Board members and various attorneys met on December 17,
1986, to discuss what had happened. The following action,
which appears in appellant Zilles's minutes, concluded that
Board meeting:
After everyone had left, except Board
members, Lynn Mieckle made a motion that
we have IMPA indemnify our action as Board
members of Cache Valley Dairy
Association. That after this is done, we
go home and milk cows. LaThair Peterson
seconded. A vote was taken with 12 for
and 4 against. Gene Brice refrained from
voting. Those voting against were Rolfe
Tuddenham, Willis Hall, Joe May and
Douglas Quayle. Meeting adjourned.
The record does not indicate any follow-up action on the
indemnification motion.
The appellants filed this lawsuit two months later, on
February 18, 1987, alleging five causes of action. In the
first, labeled -illegal merger," appellants claimed that CVDA
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and IMPA failed to follow legal procedures for merger;
therefore, the purported merger was null and void. The
substance of the allegations is that the two agricultural
cooperatives merged without affording specific notice, voting,
and dissenting rights mandated by the merger provisions in the
Agricultural Cooperative Associations Statute, Utah Code Ann.
§§ 3-1-30 to -41. The relief sought in this claim was
rescission of the merger itself and all transactions by which
it had been accomplished, by return of CVDA's assets to it or
payment by defendants of -damages- in excess of $55,000,000,
the amount by which CVDA's assets had allegedly been "diluted
and dissipated- as a result of the illegal merger and
subsequent activities.2
The second cause of action, labeled "Shareholders'
Derivative Action," added allegations to support appellants'
request for certification of the suit as a shareholders'
derivative action pursuant to Rule 23.1 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure. Appellants alleged facts about the CVDA
Board's unwillingness to assert CVDA'a unspecified "rights" to
"protect its property and business" against IMPA and the
defendant CVDA Board members. The third cause of action,
captioned "Negligence," was directed at the activities of
counsel who advised the two co-ops and supervised the
transactions by which they combined. The claim, brought by
appellants as directors and as class representatives and on
behalf of CVDA, alleged that attorney Randon Wilson failed to
exercise due diligence and care and violated his "duty of
trust, loyalty and confidentiality to CVDA and its Directors
and Officers." The fourth cause of action, also brought by
appellants as directors and class representatives and on behalf
of CVDA, was labeled "Directors' Negligence." Appellants
alleged that the other CVDA directors were negligent in not
knowing and following the statutory requirements for merger
found in sections 3-1-30 to -41, and that their breach of their
duty of due care proximately resulted in more than $55,000,000
in damages to CVDA. The relief requested under the second,
third, and fourth causes of action was the same as that

2. Although appellants contend that their first cause of
action sets forth their individual claims for damages resulting
from the "illegal merger," they have advanced no theory or
legal authority to support any such individual claims for
damages caused by the "dissipation and dilution" of CVDA's
assets.
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requested under the first cause of action.
The fifth cause of action, captioned -Rescission,H was
asserted against defendants Sam Soe 1-10 who "subsequent to the
purported merger of CVDA into IMPA took title to property of
CVDA from IMPA or have taken liens, mortgages, encumbrances or
secured interests in the property of CVDA.H Appellants alleged
that these transfers were null and void because IMPA had no
authority to alienate the property of CVDA. They asked the
court to restore the property to CVDA by ordering these
defendants to -release, relinquish and reconvey any and all
secured interest, liens or property received from IMPA."
Several motions, including those for summary judgment and
dismissal, were presented and argued to the trial court. The
parties submitted -interchanges" of facts in which some facts
were not fully agreed upon, but the material facts on which the
trial court based its judgment were not disputed. Appellants
moved for partial summary judgment seeking a declaration that
there was no valid merger and that the asset transfers were
null and void. They also requested an injunction requiring the
CVDA Board of Directors to resume control of CVDA's assets and
personnel pending new elections.
In response, defendants conceded that sections 3-1-30 to
-41 had not been complied with before CVDA's assets were
transferred to IMPA in exchange for IMPA's assumption of CVDA's
obligations, but contended that the statute did not apply to
combinations brought about by transfers of assets. They also
filed a joint motion for summary judgment, alternatively based
on the nonexclusivity of the statutory merger provisions,
federal pre-emption, and the equitable doctrines of waiver and
laches.
The trial court agreed that, even if the statutory merger
provisions applied to the combination of the four cooperatives
in this case, the claims asserted by appellants individually
and on behalf of CVDA for rescission of the merger and return
of its assets were barred by laches. According to its
memorandum decision, the trial court reached this conclusion
because rights of the other cooperatives and third parties had
intervened over the course of the gradual combination of the
cooperatives. These parties had changed their positions in
reliance on the apparent acquiescence by CVDA and its members
during and after the combination process. Although the written
decision shows the court's reasoning leading to judgment in
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favor of respondents on appellants' first, second, and fifth
causes of action, it does not reveal any basis for the court's
apparent award of judgment on the two negligence claims against
CVDA's attorney and directors.3
'
With this in mind, we first consider whether, on the
undisputed facts before it, the trial court correctly
determined that respondents were entitled to judgment as a
matter of law on appellants' first, second, and fifth causes of
action for rescission because of laches. See, e.g., D&L Supply
v. Saurini, 775 P.2d 420 (Utah 1989).
For purposes of analysis, we will assume that the merger
provisions found in sections 3-1-30 to -41 applied to the
transaction by which CVDA's operations, assets, and liabilities
were taken over by IMPA, even though respondents characterize
the transaction as something other than a merger. We interpret
sections 3-1-30 to -41 as creating individual rights in the
members of an agricultural cooperative to enforce the mandated
procedures and member vote requirements for accomplishing a
merger.4 See Pitts v. Halifax Country Club. Inc. 19 Mass.
3. Appellants are responsible for much of the confusion in the
court's disposition of this case. Their causes of action and
claims for relief were inadequately thought through and poorly
pleaded. They seemed oblivious to the difference between a
claim for damages and rescission as a form of equitable relief
for a successul plaintiff, which may involve return to the
status quo or the monetary equivalent of rescission if return
to the status quo is impractical. See note 2, supra.
Appellants also seemed unaware of the difference between their
individual claims under the statutory merger provisions as CVDA
members, for which they apparently sought certification of a
class consisting of all members and equity holders, and the
claims for injury to CVDA, which belonged only to CVDA and
which could properly be brought as a derivative action, not as
a class action. See Richardson v. Arizona Fuels Corp., 614
P.2d 636 (Utah 1980); sfifi also 12B Fletcher Cyc. Corp. § 5908
(1984). MA class action and a derivative action rest upon
fundamentally different principles of substantive law; to
ignore those differences is not a minor procedural solecism."
Richardson, 614 P.2d at 638.
4. Besides enforcement of the merger provisions in the
Agricultural Cooperative Association Act as they relate to
requirements for prior member approval of a merger plan, the
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App. 525, 476 N.E.2d 222 (1985); see also U-Beva Mines v.
Toledo Mining Co., 24 Utah 2d 351, 471 P.2d 867, 869 (1970)
(interpreting statute requiring stockholder approval of sale of
all corporate assets). That enforcement could take the form of
an action in equity to enjoin any action to effectuate a
planned merger or to set aside a merger not carried out with
the approval required by the statute.
In their first cause of action, appellants apparently were
trying to assert their individual rights to enforce the voting
provisions in the statute. Each other cause of action pleaded
is derivative in nature, alleging injury to, or asserting a
right purportedly belonging to CVDA itself. See Richardson v,
Arizona Fuels Corp.. 614 P.2d 636 (Utah 1980).
The crux of appellants1 allegations is that, because of
noncompliance with sections 3-1-30 to -41, the
merger/consolidation transaction and all transfers of assets
implementing it (including all legal documents utilized to
transfer assets, assume liabilities, and proceed
with the
operation of the new cooperative, IMPA) are HillegalH and "null
and void." Appellants err in their conclusion that the
implementing acts performed by CVDA and the ultimate result,
i.e., merger, are null and void. In Pitts, 476 N.E.2d at 227,
a shareholder of the merged surviving corporation brought an
action seeking to rescind the merger with two other
corporations or to exercise statutory appraisal and payment
rights for his shares. The court stated he was not on sound
ground concerning the failure to comply with statutory merger
requirements, because noncompliance -does not void the merger
per se, but instead makes it voidable at the insistence of a
shareholder who for any reason objects to the merger and is not
by his actions estopped from voicing his objection thereto."
We conclude that noncompliance with the merger provisions
in sections 3-1-30 to -35 does not void the merger per se, but
renders the merger voidable by objecting members. However,
such members, like shareholders in corporations, are subject to
equitable defenses when they seek to set aside an

(footnote 4, continued)
statute provides "dissenting members" a single remedy, i.e.,
payment by the surviving cooperative "of the fair value of the
interest of such member," Utah Code Ann. § 3-1-40 (1988), which
appellants did not seek.
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accomplished merger because of noncompliance with sections
3-1-30 et, seq. : 5
If a stockholder, with knowledge of
wrongful acts on the part of the directors
or a majority of the stockholders, stands
by for an unreasonable time without taking
any steps to set the acts aside or
otherwise interfere, and rights are
acquired by others, his right to sue is
barred by his laches, however clear his
right to relief would have been if he had
moved promptly.

^K

12B Fletcher Cyc. Corp. § 5874 (1984) (footnote omitted). In
the more specific context of an action seeking relief from a
consolidation or merger, Fletcher asserts that a stockholder
must act with reasonable dispatch in view
of all the circumstances of the case.
Unexcused delay may bar his right to
relief, particularly where the rights of
innocent third persons have intervened.
. . . [Stockholders may be barred by
laches, in a proper case, from attacking
the consolidation where they had either
actual notice of the consolidation or
notice of facts sufficient to put them on
notice . . . .

5.

It is immaterial whether the
transaction assailed is void or voidable.
If the complainant has been guilty of
laches, a court of equity will not look
into the transaction at all. It requires
conscience, good faith and reasonable
diligence. These wanting, the court will
remain passive and leave the parties where
it finds them.

Ruthrauff v. Silver Kino W. Mining & Milling Co., 95 Utah 279,
80 P.2d 338, 347 (1938); S£fi Peck v. Monson. 652 P.2d 1325,
1328 (Utah 1982) (Oaks, J., concurring) ("equity only aids the
vigilant, and will deny relief to a litigant who sleeps on his
rights").
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*

15 Fletcher Cyc. Corp. § 7161 (1979) (footnotes omitted);
accorfl Federal Home Loan Bank Board v. Elliott, 386 F.2d 42
(9th Cir. 1967) (stockholder action to set aside merger barred
by laches), cert, denied, 390 U.S. 1011 (1967). As formulated
by the Utah Supreme Court, the doctrine of laches is
appropriately applied where there is (1) unreasonable delay by
a plaintiff in seeking an available remedy, and (-2) prejudice
to the defendant resulting from that delay. Borland v.
Chandler, 733 P.2d 144, 147 (Utah 1987). That prejudice could
result from a transfer of title to property or the intervention
of third party rights. Mawhinnev v. Jensen, 120 Utah 142, 232
P.2d 769, 773 (1951).
We now examine each element of laches in relation to the
appellants. First, did they unreasonably delay in seeking
rescission of the merger based on noncompliance with sections
3-1-30 to -41? The appellants served as directors of CVDA at
all material times. Each voted to enter into the letter of
intent to merge knowing three existing cooperatives and one new
cooperative would, as a result thereof, proceed faithfully
through the merger process, relying on them and CVDA to do
likewise. That letter of intent described what they wanted to
accomplish (merger or consolidation) and how they would do it.
Later, after the merger process had been underway for about
eighteen months, the appellant directors voted to seek member
approval of their prior plan, with one unidentified director
dissenting. Each of the appellant directors, as a producer
member, received notice of a special meeting of members to
approve the merger/consolidation plan which they had adopted.
Again, the notice stated what was to be accomplished and what
the end result would be, i.e., merger/consolidation. The
record does not verify whether each of the appellants attended
the special meeting of members and, if so, how they voted as
members. Even so, as directors they were charged with
sufficient knowledge that the vote was 103 for and 43 against
the plan and that the events and actions they had set in motion
were rolling forward to the ultimate goal of merger or
consolidation or combination that would include the transfer of
CDVA's assets to IMPA, which took place in February 1986.
The appellants, as members and directors, knew that a
merger/consolidation had been initiated. They launched it in
their Board meeting on June 27, 1984. They reaffirmed it in
their Board meeting November 27, 1985, when they acted to call
a special meeting of members to approve their plan. They knew
that a large majority of the members present at the special
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meeting on December 16, 1985, voted to approve a merger,
consolidation or transfer of assets and liabilities. They knew
or should have known that their officers were proceeding to
effectuate the combination when appropriate documents were
executed and delivered in February 1986. Nonetheless, they did
not take any action to set aside the combination of the
cooperatives into IMPA between December 16, 1985, and February
1986. They failed to do anything until some time after the
merger was complete on August 1, 1986. At the December 17,
1986, CVDA Board meeting, the only affirmative action proposed
was to seek indemnification from IMPA. The minutes are devoid
of any proposal by appellants or anyone else to rescind or set
aside the combination. Instead, appellants waited until six
months after the merger/consolidation was complete to commence
these proceedings challenging the validity of the merger. We
conclude that their delay, under the circumstances, was
unreasonable.
Second, were the defendants prejudiced by the delay?
The record conclusively shows that CVDA and IMPA changed
their positions during the delay period and that myriad rights
of numerous third parties intervened in that interim, CVDA
transferred its assets in exchange for IMPA's assumption of its
liabilities. The third parties affected include the other
three consolidating cooperatives and their members, the members
of IMPA and its creditors, customers and employees, all of whom
substantially changed their legal status in reliance upon the
actions taken by CVDA to participate in and accomplish the
merger. They were not in a position to know whether CVDA was
jumping through each and every procedural hoop within the
confines of its cooperative organization. These persons had
every right to believe that CVDA had complied with every legal
requirement for completion of the merger and to rely upon that
belief in changing their positions with respect to both CVDA
and IMPA. The merger was in process for two years before
completed and was a fully executed transaction for six months
before appellants filed this suit.
Although we do not condone any efforts to undermine the
statutory rights given to members of agricultural cooperatives
involved in mergers, we conclude, on the undisputed facts
before the court, that the trial court correctly applied the
doctrine of laches and granted judgment in favor of respondents
on appellants' first cause of action.

We next consider the other causes of action grounded on
noncompliance with the statutory merger provisions. In both
their second and fifth causes of action, appellants sought to
derivatively assert the purported right of CVDA to rescind the
merger and all attendant transfers of assets because of its
failure to comply with the statutory merger provisions.
Throughout this litigation, none of the parties has raised or
briefed the preliminary issue of whether a cooperative's
noncompliance with the merger provisions in the Agricultural
Cooperative Association Act can even be asserted by the
cooperative itself as a basis for rescinding its contract to
merge or any transaction or document by which it transferred
assets. If the statute cannot be used as a sword by the
cooperative, the cooperative had no claims as set forth in the
second and fifth causes of action that could be asserted either
by the cooperative itself or by members on its behalf in a
derivative action. In Sailer v. Land-Livestock-Recreation,
Inc., 268 Or. 551, 522 P.2d 214 (1974), the court held that
noncompliance with a similar statute requiring shareholder
approval of a mortgage of substantially all of a corporation's
assets was assertable only by shareholders. See Pitts, 476
N.E.2d at 427 (noncompliance "will not normally be a ground for
invalidation at the instance of others"). Interpreting a
similar Utah statute requiring shareholder approval of sales of
all corporate assets, the Utah Supreme Court first seemed to
say that the statute, was not assertable at all by the
corporation itself to void a lease with purchase option, but
then backed off and appeared to pin the result on laches or
estoppel by referring to the lapse of time the corporation had
waited to seek avoidance of the lease, all the while accepting
lease payments. U-Beva Mines. 471 P.2d at 869.
Because this important question was not raised or argued,
we decline to resolve it here. Assuming that CVDA could assert
its own noncompliance with the statutory merger provisions as a
basis for setting aside its merger into IMPA and voiding all
legal documents transferring assets to IMPA, the derivative
claims seeking rescission set forth in appellants' second and
fifth causes of action are, nonetheless, barred by laches for
the same reasons already discussed. See Becker v. Becker, 66
Wis. 731, 225 N.W.2d 884, 885 (1975).
Finally, we address the trial court's disposition of
appellants' third and fourth causes of action asserting
negligence claims. The court considered several pending
motions simultaneously and disposed of them in a brief and
incomplete memorandum decision. See text at note 3, supra.
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It

is impossible for us to divine whether the court intended (a)
to actually grant judgment on the third and fourth causes of
action based on a conclusion that there could be no such
negligence, e.g., because the merger provisions in sections
3-1-30 to -41 did not apply to the combination of cooperatives
in this case; or (b) to dismiss the two causes of action based
on negligence without prejudice for other reasons having to do
with their derivative nature. For example, perhaps the court
determined that, on the facts before it, appellants had not
adequately demonstrated efforts to obtain the desired action
from the CVDA directors or members or shown adequate reasons
for the failure to make such efforts. See Utah R. Civ. P.
23.1. Or perhaps the trial court determined that the
appellants would not fairly and adequate represent the
interests of similarly situated members in enforcing any rights
CVDA might have against its attorney and directors arising out
of their alleged negligence. See ajl.
Because we are unable to determine the trial court's basis
for entering judgment in favor of respondents on the two
derivative negligence claims, we reverse the trial court's
order of July 23, 1987, insofar as it relates to appellants'
third and fourth causes of action and remand for further
proceedings. However, insofar as the order dismisses
appellants' first, second, and fifth causes of action and
awards judgment to respondents, it is affirmed. The parties
are to bear their own costs on appeal.
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iff Ju
Norman H. Jacksorf;
Judge

I CONCUR:

n r, , R .
F

Robert Bullock, Judge

s*

ORME, J. (concurring):
I concur in the court's exhaustive opinion disposing of
this appeal. I question, however, our decision not to publish
the opinion.
Although I do not quite agree that every appellate decision
more extensive than an order merits publication, Q£.. Paffel v.
Paffel, 732 P.2d 96, 104 (Utah 1986) (Zimmerman, J.,
concurring), I do believe that, absent unusual circumstances,
if an appeal merits a full-blown opinion, the opinion should be
published. Conversely, publication may properly be dispensed
with where a short, summary opinion or a memorandum decision,
employing only settled principles of law, is an adequate
treatment of a comparatively simple appeal.
The instant appeal is factually complex and poses difficult
legal issues. Accordingly, the court's opinion sets forth the
facts in detail and analyzes the key issues carefully. It
treats Utah statutory provisions which have not been considered
in prior appellate decisions. Its discussion of laches in the
context of corporate merger is insightful and would prove
useful as precedential guidance to practitioners and trial
courts confronting similar cases. Thus, the opinion merits
publication.
This court's practice has been to defer completely to the
main opinion's author on the question of whether or not a
particular disposition is published. This case demonstrates
the difficulty with that custom. If I had authored the
opinion, it would be published. Because another judge has
authored it, it will not be. This strikes me as an
unsatisfactory state of affairs, especially since a decision
not to publish is tantamount to depriving an opinion of any
precedential value. See Utah Code of Judicial Administration
§ 4-508 (effective January 15, 1990). The court should
reassess its practice in this regard.
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APPENDIX B

IN T H E FIRST J U D I C I A L DISTRICT C O U R T , C O U N T Y OF C A C H E
S T A T E O F UTAH

GENE B R I C E , et al
Plaintiffs

MEMORANDUM

DECISION

Civil N o .

25514

v.
CACHE V A L L E Y DAIRY A S S O C I A T I O N ,
a Utah A r g i c u l t u r a l
C o o p e r a t i v e , e t al
Defendants

There have b e e n v a r i o u s m o t i o n s for p a r t i a l summary

judgment,

motions t o d i s m i s s , motions for summary j u d g m e n t , m o t i o n s t o have
the Court d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r a class action can be b r o u g h t , and
other motions to strike.

T h e C o u r t w i l l address a l l o f these

motions collectively r a t h e r than

individually.

As to t h e class action m o t i o n , t h e C o u r t h o l d s t h a t t h e class
action is n o t a p p r o p r i a t e f o r reasons that three d i f f e r e n t c l a s s e s ,
equity h o l d e r s , p r o d u c e r s , d i r e c t o r s , m a y have d i f f e r e n t

interests,

and for o t h e r reasons t h a t w i l l b e b e t t e r u n d e r s t o o d as set forth
in t h e

body o f t h i s m e m o r a n d u m d e c i s i o n .

Plaintiffs are s e e k i n g r e c e s s i o n o f t h e a c t i o n t a k e n b y t h e
defendants o f w h a t is t e r m e d b y t h e p l a i n t i f f s a m e r g e r under Section
^ 1 - 3 1 , U.C.A.

T h e y are also s e e k i n g restitution a n d a separate

i5 qause o f action for money d a m a g e s .

T h e reason they seek this

relief

r^ co . ,
en
- ls that the defendants failed to affect a valid merger by reason of
m
2
— «-u,«v kilure to comply with statutory procedures on mergers. The Court
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Brice v. Cache Valley Dairy Assn.
Civil No. 25514
June 26, 1987
Page Two

plan of merger (consolidation) but there is no description of
a sale of assets as an alternative in the notice.

The Court

holds that the Notice was defective if it was contemplated there
was to be a merger or consolidation.
holds that this never occurred.

And, the Court in fact,

The Court, however, holds that

a merger or consolidation is not an exclusive alternative to a
change or affecting a consolidation by exchange of assets.
The Court holds that first there can be no recession as there
are many other entities, people involved, that have so changed
their position in reliance upon the transfer of assets that it
would be inequitable for the Court to consider the remedies of
recession and restitution.
finds that

But, more importantly, the Court

there was no merger or consolidation, but there was

a transfer of assets by CVD to IMPA for consolidation putting
members or producers in CVD in a position where they may have a
cause of action for monetary damage by reason of the elimination of
all of the assets of CVD which destroys the value of their equity
rights.

The Court makes no holdings in this regard since there

is no indications of a request for such damages in the complaint
by the plaintiffs by reason of a sale of the assets, the plaintiffs
relying solely for relief by reason of an invalid merger.
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B r i c e v. Cache V a l l e y Diary Assn.
C i v i l No. 25514
June 2 6 , 1987
Page Three

There f o r e , t h e Court d i s m i s s e s p l a i n t i f f ' s

complaint

a g a i n s t a l l d e f e n d a n t s w i t h o u t p r e j u d i c e t o amend t h e complaint
f o r any p o s s i b l e monetary damages by reason o f t h e d e s t r u c t i o n o f
t h e p l a i n t i f f s e q u i t y i n CVD as a r e s u l t o f t r a n s f e r o f

assets.

Counsel f o r d e f e n d a n t s t o prepare t h e a p p r o p r i a t e o r d e r .
Dated t h i s

29th

day o f J u n e , 19 87.
BY THE COURT:
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VeNoy^ C h r i s t b f f e r s e h
D i s t r i c t Judge
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M.David E/kez'sley^ - 41$, BesW Bldg. - SLC, Utah 84111
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ROGER P. CHRISTENSEN
ROGER FAIRBANKS
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C.
510 Clark Learning Office Center
175 South West Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 355-3431
JAMES C. JENKINS
JENKINS, MCKEAN & ASSOCIATES
67 East 100 North
Logan, Utah 84321
(801) 752-4107
Attorneys for IMPA
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE
GENE BRICE, WILLIS HALL,
JOSEPH R. MAY, DOUGLAS QUAYLE,
THEDFORD ROPER, J. ROLFE
TUDDENHAM and GORDON ZILLES,
on behalf of themselves, for
the benefit of Cache Valley
Dairy Association and for all
members and/or Holders
Certificates of Interest in
Cache Valley Dairy Association,

ORDER

Plaintiffs,
vs.

Civil No. 25514

CACHE VALLEY DAIRY ASSOCIATION,
a Utah Agricultural Cooperative;
INTERMOUNTAIN MILK PRODUCERS
ASSOCIATION; a Utah Agricultural
Cooperative; VERNON BANKHEAD;
RANDALL BRADSHAW; DON C. NYE;
FRANK P. OLSEN; WILFORD B. MEEK;
LATHAIR PETERSON; RULON KING;
LARRY PITCHER; LYNN MICKEL;
ROBERT HAWORTH; JEFF HYDE; EVAN
SKINNER; ROBERT JACKSON; and
WILLIAM LINDLEY; RANDON WILSON;
JOHN DOES 1-30; SAN SOES 1-10,
Defendants.

!<• I' I. '"I

n ^

,„nn

2 . 1337
alHS.AJlBl, Clerk
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Various motions for partial summary judgment, motions to
dismiss, motions for summary judgment, motions to have the Court
determine whether a class action can be brought, motions to
strike and other matters are currently pending before the Court.
The Court, in this order, addresses these motions collectively,
rather than individually.
The Court heard the arguments of counsel, reviewed the
record in this case and issued a memorandum decision.

Based

thereon, and for the reasons stated therein, now, therefore, it
is hereby Ordered that:
1.

Plaintiffs' Request for Class Certification be, and

hereby is denied;
2.

Plaintiffs' claims for rescission and restitution be,

and hereby are dismissed;
3.

Plaintiffs' claims, as pleaded in this case, be and

hereby are dismissed as to all Defendants without prejudice.
However,

such

dismissal

is

without

prejudice

to

Plaintiffs' right to amend the complaint to assert such claims as
Plaintiffs

may

have

for

monetary

damages,

to

the

extent

Plaintiffs may have sustained such damages, for the destruction
or

diminution,

if any,

of

the

value

of

Plaintiffs' equity

interests, as a result of a wrongful transfer of CVDA's assets to
IMPA and the transfer of such equity interests from CVDA to IMPA.
By granting leave to Plaintiffs to assert such claims, the Court
makes no determination as to whether the transfer of assets was
wrongful and makes no determination as to the merit, if any, of
such

claims,

but

reserves

such

determinations

nnn. (]Pl7 ,.'i :{[){]/[

for

future

587

consideration.
DATED this

": 7-

day of July, 1987,

BY THE COURT
, /

VeNoy Christoffersen
District Court Judge

